Recognising Uniqueness in the Technology Key Learning Area: The Search for Meaning

The purpose of this study was to investigate areas of significance which were related to the understanding of technology and technology education, identified by teachers introducing the key learning area, technology, into their primary school classrooms for the first time. Working from Australia's national document on technology education, A Statement on Technology for Australian Schools (Curriculum Corporation, 1994), two teachers wrestled with how to fit this new curriculum area into their current classroom programs, their understandings of technology as a phenomenon and with their beliefs about teaching and learning in general. The study showed that the teachers made sense of technology education as it related to, from their perspectives, ideas about and aspects of primary school classrooms with which they felt comfortable. Implications for professional development include the need to acknowledge and value the prior experiences and understandings of primary teachers. The challenge for teachers in implementing technology education is gaining a conceptualisation of the learning area, which in some respects, is very like other more familiar learning areas in the primary curriculum, but in many other respects, unique.     

Bundling of substitutes or complements

The Adams-Yellen two good bundling framework is generalized to allow the goods to be substitutes or complements. General theorems on price change effects are given. A monopolist may find it most profitable to offer the goods only as a bundle, even if they are (imperfect) substitutes, or to not bundle the goods, even if they are complements. If one good is competitively sold, a monopoly producer of the other good can never increase profits by offering his good only as part of a bundle. However, such a monopolist might profitably offer his good in both bundled and unbundled form to price discriminate, even if the two goods are substitutes.     

Beyond belief: A benchmark for human resources

Many Human Resource (HR) professionals feel and believe that they have made progress during the 1980s. Unfortunately, without data to benchmark progress, assessments must depend on perception rather than evidence. To move beyond belief towards a national HR database, this article reports research on over 10,000 individuals in 1200 businesses in 91 firms. It establishes a benchmark for HR practices and HR professionals. It also highlights areas where HR professionals may focus attention to become more successful as business partners.     

GROUP EFFECTS AND BETA NONSTATIONARITY

Recent evidence indicates that while random diversification can lead to the elimination of the majority of systematic risk, the systematic selection of securities can result in significant group effects blocking this dissipation of unsystematic risk. The group effects associated with investment in growth, cyclical, stable and oil stocks found by Farrell and Martin and Klemkosky were reexamined while allowing for beta nonstationarity. It was found that the beta nonstationarity effect, while quite large for individual stocks and small portfolios tended diversify away quite quickly. It was further found that much of what has in the past been termed a group effect is actually the result of beta nonstationarity.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers

The paper examines simple monetary and fiscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. Under this assumption, government debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics. The key analytical finding is that without explicit reference to the level of government debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics. Specifically, we identify bifurcations associated with threshold values of steady-state debt, leading to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements.     

Sociality and money1

This is a translation of ‘Socialité et argent’, a text by Emmanuel Levinas originally published in 1987. Levinas describes the emergence of money out of interhuman relations of exchange and the social relations – sociality – that result. While elsewhere he has presented sociality as ‘nonindifference to alterity’ it appears here as ‘proximity of the stranger’ and points to the tension between an economic system based on money and the basic human disposition to respond to the face of the other person. Money both encodes and effaces sociality, both designates and disguises social relations. It arises from the way that needs and interests are manifested in exchange relations, in what he calls the ‘interestedness’ of economic life. But interests are always already cut through by the fact that being is always ‘being with others’. Being is always ‘interbeing’. Interestedness is always confronted by disinterestedness, that is, by a sociality marked by the ‘goodness of giving’, attachment to and concern for the poverty of the other person. Levinas concludes with a discussion of sociality and justice, posing questions about the tension between the demand to respond to an Other immediately before me and at the same time to respond to the demands of an other Other (the third person) who also invites a response.     

Integer goal programming model for the implementation of multiple corporate objectives

The problem of long-range planning and investment project evaluation is complicated by the presence of multiple conflicting goals measured in incommensurable units, indivisibility of alternative projects, and the desire of management to consider mutually exclusive marketing-pricing strategies. The model proposed in this study attempts to allow for these complexities through the use of integer goal programming. It is the hope of the authors that this model will provide management with an additional decision-making tool for implementation of multiple corporate objectives.     

On the Possibility of Profitable Self-Selection Contracts in Competitive Insurance Markets

Several studies extend the Rothschild–Stiglitz model of competitive insurance contracting with adverse selection by incorporating additional dimensions of private information and conclude that some insurers may earn positive profit in a separating, self-selection equilibrium, provided each insurer is restricted to making a single contract offer. The main result of this article is that these profitable configurations are not sustainable when individual insurers can offer multiple contracts. It is also shown that the ability to offer multiple contracts overturns equilibria that have applicants from different risk classes pooled as well as those where profits are dissipated by a fixed entry cost.